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Institutional dynamics of regulatory actors in the recruitment of migrant 
workers: The case of Indonesia1
Moch Faisal Karim
Abstract
This paper examines how institutional dynamics among regulatory institutions affect the 
governance of the recruitment of Indonesian low-skilled migrant workers. Two institutional 
reforms have been made to create better governance for Indonesian migrant workers in the 
post-authoritarian era. One was the establishment of the National Agency for the Placement 
and Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers (BNP2TKI) while the other was the granting 
of greater responsibility to local governments to supervise migrant worker recruitment. In 
spite of these institutional reforms, little progress has been made in the protection of 
Indonesian migrant workers. The paper reveals that the restrictive regulatory framework for 
the recruitment of migrant workers, which curbs private recruitment agencies, does not create 
better migrant worker governance since the newly established regulatory framework does not 
take into consideration the horizontal relationship between the old and new institutions and 
the vertical relationship between the central and sub-national governments. Horizontally, the 
bad institutional design of the new regulatory framework proposed to replace the old one has 
created institutional rivalry between the newly established regulatory actor and the old one. 
Vertically, the reluctance of central government to decentralise authorities to sub-national 
government has amputated the ability of sub-national governments to perform a supervisory 
role in the recruitment process. These two inter-related factors have hindered the effort to 
create a better recruitment process for Indonesian migrant workers. 
Keywords: Decentralization, Indonesian migrant workers, institutional dynamics, 
institutional rivalry, BNP2TKI
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Introduction
The main challenge arising from the governance of Indonesian migrant workers is the 
persistence of chaotic recruitment process experiences by Indonesian migrant workers at 
home. In order to create a better recruitment process for Indonesian migrant workers, two 
main institutional reforms were carried out immediately after Indonesia underwent a process 
of democratic transition from Suharto’s authoritarian rule (1966-1998) to a democratic 
environment. The first reform involved the establishment of the National Agency for the 
Placement and Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers (commonly abbreviated as 
BNP2TKI) as a new institution to manage the recruitment process, as well as the protection 
of Indonesian migrant workers abroad. Since its inception in 2006, BNP2TKI has been 
expected to provide more coherent coordination among government institutions in the 
recruitment process, as well as overseas protection of Indonesia migrant workers. It also has a 
role in better supervising the private recruitment agencies, which are significant actors in the 
migrant worker recruitment process in Indonesia. 
The second reform was the granting of greater responsibility to sub-national 
governments to supervise migrant worker recruitment. This is an implication of the 
decentralisation process that has been ongoing in Indonesia since 2001 after the collapse of 
the authoritarian regime (Hadiz, 2004). Prior to decentralisation, the governance of 
international migrant workers was characterised by a centralistic approach where the 
management of migrant worker recruitment was solely under central government authority. 
Since the decentralisation, sub-national governments have greater authority to manage and 
supervise the recruitment process (Bachtiar, 2011b). This arrangement is expected to curb 
many problems occurring at the early stage of the recruitment process, such as identity fraud 
and extortion, which happen on the local level (Basa et al., 2009; Bachtiar, 2011a; Direktorat 
Pengkajian Bidang Internasional Lemhanas, 2013). 
In spite of these institutional reforms in the governance of Indonesian migrant 
workers, little progress has been made. Indonesian migrant workers still encounter many 
problems at home even before they depart. Furthermore, issues faced by many Indonesian 
migrant workers abroad can be traced back to abuse in the recruitment process at home 
(Amnesty International, 2013; Farbenblum et al., 2013). BNP2TKI, which aims to create 
better coordination among government institutions and manage the private recruitment 
agencies is still not able to facilitate the coordination among the government institutions that 
deal with migrant worker issues (Tempo.co, 2012). Furthermore, it has failed to eradicate the 
prevalent bad practices of private recruitment agencies in handling Indonesian migrant 
workers (BPK, 2010).
Given this backdrop, this paper aims to answer the question of why the recruitment 
process for Indonesian low-skilled migrant workers has become more complex despite the 
Indonesian government’s effort to make it more coordinated through the establishment of 
BNP2TKI. Furthermore, it attempts to discuss why the sub-national governments are unable 
to protect their migrant workers from exploitation during the recruitment process despite their 
greater role in supervising and managing the migrant worker recruitment process. This paper 
asserts that the establishment of new institutions does not necessarily create more coherent 
coordination among the government institutions dealing with migrant workers. On the 
contrary, the establishment of the new institution, BNP2TKI, has created unintended 
institutional rivalry with the previous institution responsible for the governance of migrant 
workers, the Ministry of Manpower. This institutional rivalry, characterised by the 
overlapping distribution of responsibility and the conflict over authority, has aggravated the 
management of migrant worker recruitment in Indonesia. Furthermore, the conditions of 
migrant worker recruitment in Indonesia are becoming more complex due to the defective 
decentralisation caused by the obscure legal framework and the limited authority given by the 
central government to sub-national governments. This condition has eventually been 
exploited by recruitment agencies for their own interests and has, thus, hindered efforts to 
create a better recruitment process for Indonesian migrant workers.
The paper employs meso-level institutional analysis to capture how internal conflict 
within the state, both at the central ministerial level and in the relation between central and 
sub-national governments are critical in understanding how migrant workers’ recruitment 
works in practice. It utilises a qualitative methodology to understand the dynamics of the 
institutional arrangement of migrant worker recruitment in Indonesia. The data were collected 
in several ways, namely by conducting interviews with relevant actors, including central 
government officials, Members of Parliament, sub-national government officials, recruitment 
agencies, as well as migrant workers. Besides the interviews, the study also involved an 
analysis of official documents, regulations and reports pertaining to the migrant worker 
recruitment process.
This paper is organised as follows. The next section discusses the analytical 
framework on the institutional approach to the governance of migrant workers. In the third 
section, an overview of the evolution of governance of migrant workers in Indonesia is given. 
The fourth and fifth sections elaborate the causes and impact of the rivalry in the institutional 
arrangement of migrant workers in Indonesia. The sixth section analyses the dynamic 
interaction between sub-national government and central government in managing migrant 
worker recruitment. The paper concludes that the complexity of the regulatory actors’ 
interaction facilitates the persistence of chaotic management of the migrant worker 
recruitment process in Indonesia. 
The state institution and bureaucracy: Institutional approach on migrant 
workers governance
Much has been written about the governance of migrant workers at the national level (Kaur, 
2010; Chin, 2003; Devasahayam, 2010; Rodriguez and Schwenken, 2013). The vast majority 
of this work is contextualised on the interaction between the state and the market under 
neoliberal logic in shaping the governance of migrant workers (Hugo, 2012; Battistella, 2012; 
Lindquist, 2010). Thus, many analyses on governance of migrant workers in developing 
countries focus on the private recruitment agencies and brokerage systems that have 
significant role in recruitment and placement process (Kaur, 2010; Xiang, 2012; McKeown, 
2012; Rodriguez, 2008; Lindquist et al., 2012). Furthermore, most of the literature on migrant 
workers to date concentrates on how the state interacts with private recruitment agencies in 
the recruitment process. For instance, in the case of the Philippines, Rodriguez (2010) argues 
that the labour brokerage is done primarily to serve the interests of the state. It works on the 
basis of sender countries offering “guarantees” of a “quality product” and involves sender 
countries taking on a lot of the work in the recruitment process of migrant workers usually 
via contracts with recruitment agencies. But, ultimately, it rests upon a view of the worker as 
a commodity. Therefore, from the beginning, it can be questioned whether the state has a 
genuine commitment to protecting migrant workers’ rights. 
In the light of a more regulated environment in which states try to create more 
regulations concerning the governance of migrant workers (Elias and Louth, 2016), few 
studies have tried to unpack the state that is mainly assumed to be a relatively homogeneous 
entity. The paper aims to fill a gap in the literature by examining how the intra-institution 
interactions within the regulatory area in both the central and sub-national governments affect 
the persistence of chaotic management of migrant worker recruitment in Indonesia. Rather 
than solely focusing on the brokerage systems on the governance of migrant workers, this 
paper shifts the discussion to the practices of state institutions to understand international 
labour migration. For this reason, this paper contributes to the literature on the Indonesian 
state in post-authoritarian era through an empirical analysis of the management of the 
Indonesian migrant worker recruitment process.
In order to analyse the intra-institutional interactions within migrant worker 
governance, this paper incorporates the literature on public administration studies into the 
analysis of the recruitment process for Indonesian migrant workers. Given that 
democratisation and decentralisation are arguably two constitutive processes that define the 
Indonesian state in the post-authoritarian regime (Hadiz, 2010), this paper focuses on two 
general aspects of the intra-institutional interactions that capture the context of newly-
democratised and decentralised states. The first is the horizontal interaction between the new 
emerging regulatory actor designed to create better governance and the old existing 
institution that represents the old governance in a newly-democratised polity. The second is 
the vertical interaction between the emergence of more authoritative sub-national government 
and the central government in a newly-decentralised environment. 
In newly-democratised developing countries, there is usually a tendency to create a 
new institution to overcome the deep-rooted problems stemming from decades of 
institutionalised bad practice during the authoritarian regime (Pereira, 1999: 4). The creation 
of new institutions could also be the logical consequence of democratic consolidation. The 
newly-established institution can be seen as an institutional shortcut to quickly reform the 
long institutionalised bad governance, while at the same time not creating turbulence within 
the old-fashioned institution, which has strong informal and patrimonial relationships that 
may prolong the reform process (Andrews, 2014). In the case where the newly-designed 
regulatory actor emerges while the old one still exists, the co-existence of regulatory actors 
within the governance will come into play. There might be two possible outcomes of this 
interaction: it may be a complementary interaction where each actor operates at the same time 
and contributes to a common objective, or there may be rivalry where the newly-formed 
regulatory actor performs the same tasks and legal regulations as the existing one (Trubek 
and Trubek, 2007). While the former may result in better governance where the two 
regulatory actors cooperate to enhance the reform within a specific regulatory arena, the latter 
creates complex dynamics that might lead to institutional rivalry, which, in turn, hinders the 
creation of better governance. 
Borrowing the theoretical framework of Jordana and Sancho (2004), there are two 
critical dimensions that can be analysed in terms of these horizontal rivalry interactions, 
namely the overlapping distribution of responsibility and the power structure. In this 
institutional setting, the distribution of responsibility refers to “how responsibility for policy 
decisions is dispersed among the institutions involved” (Jordana and Sancho, 2004: 302). 
When a new regulatory actor comes into play in a new institutional setting, there might be a 
distribution of responsibility between the existing and the new regulatory actors. The 
responsibility might not be equally distributed among the regulatory actors. One actor might 
get greater responsibility as a regulator, while the other becomes the operator within 
particular governance. However, there might be a condition where the responsibility is not 
defined clearly, leading to an overlap in responsibility. This overlapping responsibility may 
be the result of inefficient institutional design or it may be intended by policy makers to 
create a grey area in order to appease the existing institutional actor and encourage them to 
agree with the creation of the new regulatory actor.
The other dimension besides the overlapping responsibility that needs to be analysed 
is the conflict arising from the change in the power structure within a particular governance 
area. In this context, the power structure is defined as the capacity to control final policy 
decisions in the implementation of policies within a particular governance area (Jordana and 
Sancho, 2004: 300). The new regulatory actor may change the power structure constellation 
by reducing the regulatory power of the existing institutional actor. In developing countries 
where corruption is rampant, this power structure can be exploited into a source of illegal 
wealth by bureaucrats through the abuse of their institutional power to regulate (Drugov, 
2010; Kuncoro, 2006; Vial and Hanoteau, 2010). Consequently, when the new regulatory 
actor has less power than the existing institutional actor, political conflict between them is 
less likely to occur compared to the condition under which the new regulatory actor has more 
power structure to regulate.
While the process of creating a new institution as a result of democratic consolidation 
can lead to overlapping responsibilities among state entities in the central government, 
decentralisation might generate a convoluted interaction between central and sub-national 
institutions. Decentralisation is one of the consequences of democratisation in post-
authoritarian era Southeast Asia (Hadiz, 2010; Hadiz, 2004). In theory, decentralisation 
provides a greater access for local communities to a more adequate provision of services and 
more accountable sub-national government officials (Grindle, 2007). Yet, in the case of 
Indonesia, few sub-national governments have used their newly-acquired powers to promote 
reform (Rosser and Wilson, 2012: 609). Hence, decentralisation has created a mix result in 
which some sub-national governments are developed under the reform, while others are 
worse off (Firman, 2014). To address why some sub-national governments failed while others 
succeed in improving their capacity, much of the literature on the decentralisation in 
Indonesia focus on the analysis of how decentralisation has provided new rent-seeking 
opportunities for local predatory elites and thus undermined the effectiveness of 
decentralisation (Fitrani et al., 2005; Choi, 2009; Hadiz, 2004). For instance, Hadiz (2010) 
argues that the rise of local predatory networks of patronage has become a part of the 
emergence of newly-decentralised system in the post-authoritarian regime. So far, little 
attention has been given to analyse how vertical interaction between central and sub-national 
government might hinder the promise of reform attained through the decentralisation process. 
In a newly-decentralised state, the vertical interaction between the emergence of more 
authoritative sub-national government and central government is sometimes conflictual 
(Karim, 2015). As stated by McCarthy (2004: 1203), the decentralisation process in 
Indonesia was driven by the need of national policy makers to reassert the legitimacy of a 
national polity due to pressure generated by decades of central control. Despite the economic 
and political impetus for decentralisation, the bureaucracy in central government usually has 
no incentive to do so (Eaton et al., 2011: 4). Generally, bureaucracy in central ministries may 
prevent the decentralisation of major authorities since it means that they will lose some de 
jure control, which under a weak institution can be translated into a source of material gain 
for bureaucrats (Cheema and Rondinelli, 2007: 9). 
The fear of losing control might encourage the central government bureaucracy to 
resist the decentralisation process by creating an obscure legal framework, which leads to the 
fragmentation of the organisational structure of the state. Such an obscure legal framework 
may stem from the lack of clearly-defined responsibilities of the actors involved in the 
decentralisation process especially with regard to enacting regulations (Manor, 1999). As a 
result, rivalry between different levels of decision makers has been an unfortunate result of 
decentralisation in Indonesia. This condition, coupled with the limited capacity of sub-
national governments, as well as the limited authority given by central government to sub-
national ones (Kim 2008), has created so-called defective decentralisation. Hence, rather than 
creating more responsive policies in dealing with particular issues that have a greater impact 
on the local level, decentralisation may turn out to be defective and eventually hinder the 
effectiveness of sub-national government’s handling of local issues. 
Having discussed the analytical framework to analyse the governance of Indonesia’s 
migrant workers recruitment in the post-authoritarian era, the next section examines the 
changing of the governance of Indonesia’s migrant workers from authoritarian regime 
characterised with a more market-oriented to the post-authoritarian regime characterised with 
a more state intervention. 
From market-oriented to a more regulated environment
Currently, Indonesia is one of the largest senders of migrant workers in Southeast Asia. It is 
estimated that there are around 6.5 million Indonesian migrant workers working abroad 
(BNP2TKI, 2013). Each year, Indonesia sends around 600,000 migrant workers mainly to 
Southeast Asia, the Middle East and East Asia, which makes it the second largest sending 
country in Southeast Asia after the Philippines. Around 78% of the migrant workers from 
Indonesia work as domestic workers (ILO, 2013). Remittance brought by the migrant 
workers each year reaches around US$ 7 billion (Bank Indonesia, 2014). Despite the 
magnitude and importance of Indonesian migrant workers, they remain relatively unprotected 
from abuse, especially during the recruitment process. For instance, many are tricked by 
private recruitment agencies to work abroad with the lure of good wages and conditions and 
the reality turns out to be the opposite of this. They are also charged extremely excessive 
recruitment fees that make them heavily indebted.
Many migrant workers activists would argue that the lack of protection of migrant 
workers in Indonesia is due to the prevalent market mechanism, which gives a greater role to 
private recruitment agencies in the migrant worker recruitment process. As a result, many 
blame the private recruitment agencies for the problems faced by Indonesian migrant 
workers. However, this is not entirely true in the post-authoritarian period, in which the 
government has greater involvement in the recruitment of migrant workers (Xiang and 
Lindquist, 2014; Killias, 2010). Indeed, during authoritarian era under Soeharto (1966-1998), 
the governance of migrant workers was characterised by the heavy involvement of private 
agencies in the recruitment process, placement and return of migrant workers, while the role 
of the government was merely to give licence to the private agencies. In this era, Indonesian 
government policies towards migrant workers were motivated by an economic orientation in 
the placement of migrant workers abroad. The reason behind this was the high demand for 
labourers from the Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia and neighbouring countries, such as 
Malaysia in the early 1980s (Cremer, 1988). At the same time, Indonesia experienced 
economic stagnation due to the end of the oil boom era. Soeharto’s authoritarian regime 
perceived the export of migrant workers to be the most effective way to decrease the 
unemployment rate, as well as to increase foreign exchange reserves (Palmer, 2014: 56). 
One of the policies implemented by the Soeharto regime in order to increase the 
export of migrant workers was to open the door for the private sector to participate in the 
recruitment and placement of migrant workers. This policy was enforced through the 
issuance of Ministerial Regulation No. 01/1983, regarding procedures of placement of 
migrant workers for private agencies (Palmer, 2014: 62). This ministerial regulation also 
introduced the involvement of private recruitment agencies as significant actors in the 
recruitment and placement of migrant workers abroad. Through this regulation, the 
government gave authority to private recruitment agencies to conduct the majority of the 
recruitment process. In return, the Indonesian government encouraged the private agencies to 
promote Indonesian migrant workers by broadening the market for them abroad. By so doing, 
the government relied heavily on the private recruitment agencies to boost the number of 
migrant workers sent abroad and it neglected the protection aspect of Indonesian migrant 
workers (Azmy, 2011).
In the post-authoritarian era, due to the democratisation atmosphere, the civil society 
involved in the protection of migrant workers were increasingly putting pressure on the 
government to protect the Indonesian migrant workers. In particular, the urgent need to create 
a law that regulates the governance of recruitment, as well as the protection of migrant 
workers was caused by the mass deportation of Indonesian irregular migrant workers by the 
Malaysian government in 2002 (Azmy, 2011). The case of massive deportation of Indonesian 
illegal migrant workers showed how bad the legacy of Soeharto’s authoritarian regime was 
with regard to the recruitment of Indonesian migrant workers in Indonesia (Garcés-
Mascareñas, 2012: 92).
In response to the mass deportation, the government took steps to regulate the practice 
of sending migrant workers abroad through a series of laws and institutional changes enacted 
from 2002 onwards. In 2004, at the end of her tenure, President Megawati issued Law No. 
39/2004, which became the main foundation for the governance of Indonesian migrant 
workers including their recruitment and placement, as well as their protection. The law, 
known as the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers Law (Undang-
Undang Penempatan dan Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia di Luar Negeri, abbreviated 
as UU PPTKILN), became one of the first legal products at the level of national legislation to 
address the Indonesian migrant workers. During Soeharto’s authoritarian regime, laws 
governing the recruitment and protection of Indonesian migrant workers only existed at the 
level of government regulation and ministerial regulation. Hence, as argued by one 
Indonesian Member of Parliament, the enactment of Law No. 39/2004 showed that the 
central government has begun to pay a greater attention to the recruitment of Indonesian 
migrant workers, which was often overlooked by Soeharto’s authoritarian regime (interview, 
Jakarta 2014).
The adoption of Law No. 39/2004 also showed a shifting approach by the government 
compared to the previous regime. While under Soeharto’s authoritarian regime, migrant 
workers recruitment governance relied heavily on private recruitment agencies as the main 
actors in the recruitment process, with less government presence and intervention, the recent 
law means that the government plays an active role in the recruitment of Indonesian migrant 
workers. Through its intervention in the recruitment process, the government can, from the 
beginning, protect migrant workers from abuse by private recruitment agencies (Palmer, 
2014: 101). 
Despite its importance as a milestone in migrant worker governance in Indonesia, 
Law No. 39/2004 is also problematic. A careful reading of the Law indicates that it tends to 
define protection as a restriction in which the government tries to create a set of rules 
whereby the market mechanism does not control the process of exporting low-skilled migrant 
workers. Given that the process of exporting Indonesian migrant workers is highly dependent 
on agency-to-agency cooperation, rather than state-to-state cooperation or state to private 
company cooperation, the private recruitment agencies are becoming a focus of the law. Not 
surprisingly, under this law, the government seems to focus on how to restrict and regulate 
private recruitment agencies, rather than other aspects of the protection of migrant workers 
before their departure, when they are abroad, and when they return.  
However, the biggest problem caused by the enactment of this law is the confusion in 
the institutional design of the governance of Indonesian migrant workers. One of the 
fundamental changes in the governance of Indonesian migrant workers with the application 
of the law was the establishment of a new institution in the governance of Indonesian migrant 
workers called the National Agency for the Placement and Protection of Indonesia Migrant 
Workers (BNP2TKI). This institution, which is directly responsible to the President, manages 
the overall governance of Indonesian migrant workers from recruitment to placement and 
also post-placement (Article 94, Paragraphs 1 and 2). 
Bad institutional design in Indonesian migrant workers governance 
When Law No. 39/2004 was drafted, the majority of the political parties involved were 
aspired to excogitate a better recruitment service for the migrant workers both home and 
abroad. This aspiration stemmed from the loose protection of migrant workers that was 
predominant during Soeharto’s authoritarian regime and that resulted in the abuse of migrant 
workers by private recruitment agencies, especially at the stage of the recruitment process. 
Hence, BNP2TKI aimed to create more regulated governance through an independent and 
integrated body under the President, which could create better governance of Indonesian 
migrant workers. In essence, this institution is the institutionalisation of an ad hoc institution 
previously created by President B. J. Habibie in the early 2000s, namely the Coordinating 
Agency for Placement of Indonesian migrant workers (BKPTKI). Due to its ad hoc nature, 
BKPTKI, whose membership consists of nine cross-sectoral agencies, does not have the 
power to issue binding coordinated policies relating to the governance of Indonesian migrant 
workers (Azmy, 2011). Ultimately, this institution did not have a significant function in 
improving the management of the migrant worker recruitment process. Given that the 
governance of Indonesian migrant workers involves various institutions, including the 
Ministry of Manpower, the police, sub-national government and the Foreign Ministry, there 
needs to be an institution that becomes the centre of coordination in order to efficiently 
manage the recruitment and placement and protection of migrant workers. For this reason, 
President Megawati’s administration included a clause on the importance of the 
establishment of institution to coordinate the governance of Indonesian migrant workers.
As a follow up to Law No. 39/2004, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono issued 
Presidential Regulation No. 81/2006 on the Formation of BNP2TKI. The regulation 
reinforced the responsibility of BNP2TKI as an institution to manage the recruitment and 
protection of Indonesian migrant workers. Through this Presidential Regulation, the 
Directorate General for Placement and Protection of Overseas Workers (PPTKLN) under the 
Ministry of Manpower was automatically disbanded because its function was switched to 
BNP2TKI. In March 2007, the BNP2TKI officially started to operate. 
However, not all of the relevant institutions agreed with the idea of forming 
BNP2TKI. The Ministry of Manpower was the state institution that did not agree with the 
establishment of BNP2TKI. During Soeharto’s authoritarian regime, the management of 
Indonesian migrant workers was entirely the responsibility of the Ministry of Manpower, 
which had great authority in regulating migrant workers governance. Under this new law, 
however, the authority of the Ministry of Manpower in managing Indonesian migrant 
workers is limited. In these circumstances, the bureaucrats at the Ministry of Manpower 
rejected the notion to establish a new organisation to handle Indonesian migrant workers 
from the outset (personal interview, 2014). The Ministry of Manpower preferred to carry out 
a reform within its bureaucratic system so that the management of the recruitment of 
Indonesian workers could be improved.
Nevertheless, bureaucrats at the Ministry of Manpower were forced to accept the 
formation of BNP2TKI. The mandate for the establishment of BNP2TKI was a sort of 
political accommodation made by the Megawati administration in dealing with the conflict 
between several private recruitment agencies and the Ministry of Manpower (personal 
interview, 2014). The conflict stemmed from the prevalent patron-client relationship between 
the private recruitment agencies and the bureaucrats at the Ministry of Manpower. As stated 
by Blunt et al. (2012), since the fall of Soeharto, patronage has remained a defining feature of 
the governance of the Indonesian state. In the post-authoritarian era, many of the former high-
ranking bureaucrats at the Ministry of Manpower set up their own private recruitment 
agencies. Given the patron-client relations between the Ministry of Manpower and its former 
high-ranking bureaucrats, there was a high possibility of these types of private recruitment 
agencies, many of which were incorporated under the umbrella of the Association of 
Indonesian Private Recruitment Agencies (APJATI), easily obtaining permission to operate 
compared with other companies that are not related to this association. Given this condition, 
many new companies that did not have a relationship with the bureaucrats at the Ministry of 
Manpower had difficulty in obtaining permits (personal interview with private recruitment 
agencies, 2014).
Therefore, in response to the Presidential Regulation on the Formation of BNP2TKI 
in 2006, the Ministry of Manpower issued a controversial ministerial regulation (Ministerial 
Regulation No. 5/2007) to authorise the formation of a new directorate within its internal 
organisational structure, which was, in part, in response to the changing administrative 
structure as an effect of the establishment of BNP2TKI. The Directorate for Placement and 
Protection of Overseas Workers is a reincarnation of the Directorate General of PPTKLN, 
which was disbanded a year earlier. By establishing the directorate, the Ministry of 
Manpower has been running a dualistic placement service along with BNP2TKI, which 
makes the governance of migrant workers more problematic. The Ministry of Manpower 
prudently drafted the regulation so as not to legally violate the preceding law (Presidential 
Regulation No. 81/2006) despite its contradictory revival of the overseas placement function. 
A conflict has officially started.
Overlapping responsibility and conflict over authority between Ministry of 
Manpower and BNP2TKI
Due to the lack of willingness on the part of the Ministry of Manpower from the outset to 
voluntarily give up authority to the newly-established institution, the potential for inter-
institutional conflict is obvious. The conflict is increasingly unavoidable because the law 
does not clearly stipulate the relationship between these two institutions. In addition, this law 
does not clearly provide a specific distribution of responsibility between the two institutions 
in the implementation of the governance of Indonesian migrant workers. Furthermore, there 
is no straightforward article in the law that states the power structure and relations between 
the Ministry of Manpower and the newly-established BNP2TKI. Law No. 39/2004 only states 
that both shall coordinate in managing the governance of Indonesian migrant workers. As a 
result, since the founding of BNP2TKI in 2007, the Minister of Manpower, Erman Suparno, 
has insisted that the role of BNP2TKI is only as an executor of policies in the management of 
migrant workers, while the regulations and policy making are still controlled by the Ministry 
of Manpower.
Even though BNP2TKI has a primary role as an executor of policies with regard to 
migrant workers’ placement and protection, it has limited power to carry out this role since, 
in practice, there are no clear boundaries regarding what comprises “regulation making” and 
“policy operator”. Thus, the distribution of responsibility is assigned on an informal arbitrary 
basis, rather than on a legal basis via formal enactment. The excessive function of the 
Minister of Manpower as both the regulation-making authority and the policy operator in 
migrant worker governance is a case in point for the unclear distribution of responsibility. As 
a regulator, the Ministry of Manpower is authorised to formulate policy design and 
evaluation, but at the same time, the Ministry also exercises overarching power over 
licensing, such as the issuance of private recruitment company licences (SIPPTKIS) and 
recruitment licences (SIP). This authority can also be characterised as a “service” that should 
have been given to the policy operator, in this case, BNP2TKI. This circumstance shows how 
the Ministry of Manpower is reluctant to hand over its executing authorities and challenges 
the primary purpose of BNP2TKI, which is to provide an integrative operational body for the 
management of migrant workers in Indonesia (Dewanto, 2014). 
In order to further curb the power of BNP2TKI, the Ministry of Manpower issued 
Ministerial Regulation No. 22/2008 on the Implementation of the Placement and Protection 
of Overseas Workers, which had an impact on the reduction in the authority of BNP2TKI in 
overseeing the implementation of the placement of migrant workers abroad. This regulation 
has reduced BNP2TKI’s authority in managing Indonesian migrant workers, which is part of 
the government-to-government cooperation and is limited to placement in countries such as 
South Korea and Japan. Hence, the management of Indonesian migrant workers outside Japan 
and South Korea, as well as those recruited by private recruitment agencies, was then under 
the authority of the Ministry of Manpower. Given that the majority of migrant workers work 
in Middle Eastern countries and East Asian countries, such as Malaysia, Taiwan and Hong 
Kong, and the majority are also channelled through private recruitment agencies, this 
Ministerial Regulation caused BNP2TKI to only manage 0.8% of all Indonesian migrant 
workers. 
Not surprisingly, the ministerial regulation further infuriated the Chief of BNP2TKI, 
Moh. Jumhur Hidayat, a former labour activist and the leader of a widely-known workers 
union, the Association of Indonesian Independent Worker Unions (Gaspermindo). Through 
his organisation, he indirectly proposed a judicial review regarding Ministerial Regulation 
No. 22/2008 by the Supreme Court. Indeed, it was not BNP2TKI as an institution that 
proposed the judicial review, but it is evident that the judicial review was intended to retrieve 
BNP2TKI’s authority in managing migrant workers. This can be seen through the clauses 
reviewed, which coincidentally were related to BNP2TKI’s authority. The judicial review 
was finally accepted and, thus, the Supreme Court invalidated Ministerial Regulation No. 
22/2008.
In response to the Supreme Court’s decision, the Minister of Manpower decided to 
cancel Ministerial Regulation No. 22/2008 by issuing three more technical Ministerial 
Regulations. In 2009, the Ministry of Manpower issued Ministerial Regulation No. 16/2009 
on the procedures for the issuance of licences for the deployment of prospective workers 
abroad by private recruitment agencies, Ministerial Regulation No. 17/2009 on the 
procedures for the implementation of the final departure briefing for Indonesian migrant 
workers, as well as Ministerial Regulation No. 18/2009 on the procedures for obtaining 
overseas migrant worker cards. The issuance of these ministerial regulations has resulted in 
the transfer of a number of administrative services that were previously authorised by 
BNP2TKI to the Ministry of Manpower and also the provincial and district/city governments.
There are several strategic administrative services that, according to these ministerial 
regulations, are no longer authorised to BNP2TKI. First, the issuance of permits to conduct 
recruitment by private recruitment agencies was handed over to sub-national governments. 
Second, BNP2TKI is no longer authorised to carry out final departure briefing programmes 
(Persiapan Akhir Pemberangkatan) for Indonesian migrant workers, which again was handed 
over to the sub-national governments. Third, BNP2TKI is not authorised to issue overseas 
migrant worker cards (KTKLN), which every Indonesian migrant worker who wishes to go 
abroad must own. The issuance of the cards was handed over to the sub-national 
governments. Furthermore, recommendations for clinical health examinations for Indonesian 
migrant workers, the issuance of certificates of skills, which Indonesian migrant workers 
must have, insurance designation and the management of a special terminal for Indonesian 
migrant workers are also no longer authorised by BNP2TKI. However, BNP2TKI does not 
comply with these ministerial regulations and considers all strategic administrative services 
are still under its authority. Consequently, the dualism in the management of migrant workers 
in Indonesia continues.
There are various kinds of problems arising from the institutional rivalry in the 
governance of migrant workers between the Ministry of Manpower and BNP2TKI. For 
instance, there is confusion pertaining to the issuance of recruitment licences (SIP). While the 
licences of private recruitment agencies (SIPPTKIS) are issued by the Ministry of Manpower, 
the licences for the agencies to start recruiting potential migrant workers can be issued by 
both the Ministry of Manpower and BNP2TKI. Ministerial Regulation No. 14/2007 stipulated 
that its Directorate for Placement and Protection of Overseas Workers can issue the SIP 
while, at the same time, BNP2TKI can also issue the SIP under the condition that it should 
give a periodical report to the Ministry of Manpower. The reason for the issuance of this 
confusing ministerial regulation was to appease the BNP2TKI and avoid another legal battle 
in the courts. As a result, this regulatory framework has made the distribution of 
responsibility unclear between the Ministry of Manpower and BNP2TKI and created 
confusion for private recruitment agencies.  
In order to overcome this situation, usually, private recruitment agencies apply to both 
institutions for a recruitment licence to prevent unnecessary rejection by bureaucrats at either 
BNP2TKI or the Ministry of Manpower. However, this strategy is usually hard for private 
recruitment agencies to carry out since there is a tacit requirement to get a SIP, which is to 
provide a recommendation letter from two of the largest private recruitment agency 
associations, namely the Association of Indonesian Private Recruitment Agencies (APJATI) 
and the Private Recruiter Business Consortium (HIMSATAKI). It is an open secret among 
the private recruitment agencies that one needs to have a recommendation from 
HIMSATAKI to obtain a recruitment licence from BNP2TKI, while an APJATI 
recommendation is a requirement to secure a recruitment licence from the Ministry of 
Manpower. Thus, this unwritten requirement, as well as the involvement of the two biggest 
private recruitment agency associations, have further deepened the institutional rivalry 
between the Ministry of Manpower and BNP2TKI (Dewanto, 2014).
This condition, furthermore, has caused confusion with regard to the management of 
Indonesian migrant workers due to the administrative maze faced by private recruitment 
agencies. Some companies perform the administrative process through the Ministry of 
Manpower, while others use BNP2TKI. As stated by one of the private recruiters 
interviewed, this condition means that the placement and protection of migrant workers 
cannot run smoothly, including the enforcement of laws and regulations when problems 
occur in the recruitment process (interview, Malang, 2014).  
This rivalry also leads to ineffective control of private recruitment agencies. This 
condition gives space for private recruitment agencies to continue practices that are not in 
accordance with the rules, since the regulators cannot implement effective sanctions towards 
them. For instance, if a private recruitment agency is not served by the Ministry of 
Manpower, for some reason, then they will switch to BNP2TKI or vice versa. Likewise, if a 
private recruitment agency service, after its evaluation, is terminated or suspended by the 
Ministry of Manpower for a certain period of time, usually three months, then it will switch 
to BNP2TKI for permits and vice versa. This makes sanctions against malign private 
recruitment agencies ineffective (interview, migrant workers activist, Jakarta, 2014).
In 2010, the new Minister of Manpower, Muhaimin Iskandar, made a reconciliation 
with BNP2TKI. The reconciliation was reached after various attempts by the House of 
Representatives to mediate in the conflict between the two. Despite the reconciliation, each 
institution still offers its respective services with regard to both private recruitment agencies 
and migrant workers. Therefore, the institutional conflict has eased but not been solved. 
This institutional conflict resurfaced again in December 2013 when the Ministry of 
Manpower suspended 213 private recruitment agencies from operating on the basis of their 
poor performance. This suspension caused many Indonesian migrant workers to be prevented 
from being sent abroad. When the problem was reported by one of the banned private 
recruitment agencies to BNP2TKI, this institution issued a permit for this private recruitment 
agency to send Indonesian migrant workers to the United Arab Emirates. The issuance of the 
permit by BNP2TKI evoked another problem because the Ministry of Manpower accused the 
private recruitment agency of carrying out illegal trafficking and reported it to the Police. 
The discussion above shows that although BNP2TKI was designed as a new 
institution to address the bureaucratic red tape resulting from the previous governance, 
instead it has brought institutional rivalry due to its unclear distribution of responsibility with 
the Ministry of Manpower. Since it is positioned as the executor of policies made by the 
Ministry of Manpower, BNP2TKI has no authority to stipulate regulations that can be 
implemented by a wide range of institutions. Despite being directly responsible to the 
President, the institutional position of BNP2TKI is perceived by the officials within it as a 
subordinate to the Ministry of Manpower. This has created a status quo where the Ministry of 
Manpower continues to hold regulatory superiority over BNP2TKI and, thus, the confusion 
over the governance of migrant workers in Indonesia continues. Even in the current debate 
regarding the revision of Law No. 39/2004, the Ministry continues to insist that the regulatory 
function should be theirs, while BNP2TKI serves as an operational institution (Dewanto, 
2014).
Defective decentralisation in Indonesian migrant worker governance
Besides creating horizontal inter-institutional competition due to the lack of distribution of 
responsibility, Law No. 39/2004 has also created confusion in vertical inter-institutional 
relations between the central and sub-national government institutions. In line with the spirit 
of decentralisation experienced by Indonesia in the post-authoritarian era, Law No. 39/2004 
stipulates that the sub-national governments, both provincial and municipality, have greater 
responsibility in managing migrant workers governance, especially in supervising the 
recruitment process in their specific territory. Theoretically speaking, the decentralisation 
process in which the sub-national governments have a greater role in managing mostly 
domestic issues (Teresa Balaguer-Coll et al., 2010) including labour and employment may 
reduce the persistence of bad governance that affects the migrant workers (Bachtiar, 2011a). 
As suggested in the literature (Jorgensen, 2012), decentralisation may enable sub-national 
governments to come up with a specialised policy dealing with particular issues that concern 
them the most. In the case of Indonesia, decentralisation is expected to reduce the problems 
occurring in the early part of the recruitment process of migrant workers.
On the contrary, the decentralisation framework has provided a very limited solution 
in creating better governance in the recruitment process in Indonesia. In fact, the governance 
of migrant worker recruitment is becoming increasingly problematic. The reasons why 
decentralisation does not necessarily provide a greater role to sub-national government in 
managing the migrant worker recruitment process is the absence of a comprehensive legal 
foundation for sub-national governments to manage migrant worker recruitment in their 
respective areas, as well as the willingness of central government to give greater authority to 
sub-national governments (Karim, 2015). As argued by a local Member of Parliament, the 
decentralisation occurring in the post-authoritarian era has not provided a legal framework to 
operationalise the authority of sub-national governments both in the provincial and municipal 
governments so that they have strong involvement and control over migrant worker 
recruitment (interview, Sukabumi, 2014). The legal framework is important since the success 
of sub-national government in handling the recruitment process requires it to have firm and 
comprehensive authority. Therefore, migrant worker recruitment seems to be more 
centralistic, despite the law that mandates the increasing responsibility of sub-national 
government in managing the migrant worker recruitment process. 
Indeed, through Government Regulation No. 38/2007, sub-national governments have 
greater responsibility in supervising the recruitment process, including the registration of 
migrant workers, the screening of prospective migrant workers and the monitoring of the 
recruitment process. Although the obligation to supervise the recruitment process in the 
region is still in the hands of sub-national governments, the central government does not give 
greater authority to sub-national governments to carry out these functions, since Law No. 
39/2004 does not stipulate specific authority to carry out the sub-national governments’ role. 
For instance, sub-national governments have no real authority if they find misconduct 
perpetrated by private recruitment agencies. Only the Ministry of Manpower can revoke the 
licence of private recruitment agencies. Given this condition, there is a tendency that the 
initiatives undertaken by the sub-national governments fail because the authority to deal with 
very important issues, such as the establishment and monitoring of recruitment agencies, is 
still in the hands of the central government (Interview East Java Province Official, East Java, 
2014). Consequently, although there are opportunities for autonomy, there is a strong trend 
towards the centralisation of central government administration in Jakarta. The result is the 
removal of the de facto authority of sub-national governments in the administration of 
placement workers, especially in supervising the recruitment process. So, even if there are 
problems experienced by migrant workers, such as illegal recruitment, the falsification of 
documents and the arbitrary charging of excessive fees, which are likely to occur in the 
recruitment process at the sub-national level, the central government has yet to give the sub-
national government the authority to resolve these problems (interview, Malang Municipality 
Official, Malang, 2014).
Some provinces such as East Java and West Nusa Tenggara have tried to regulate the 
recruitment process in order to reduce the abuse by private recruitment agencies of potential 
migrant workers. However, due to the lack of a national legal framework for their authority, 
many of the initiatives have not worked well. In East Java, for instance, the provincial 
government enacted its own regional regulation (Perda) whereby private recruitment 
agencies should open their own branches in the area where they want to recruit potential 
migrant workers (Local Regulation No. 2/2004 and Governor Regulation No. 42/2004). This 
means that the private recruitment agencies need to pay a registration fee to the sub-national 
government. This fee is considered as an insurance should problems be encountered by 
migrant workers recruited through the private recruitment agencies. However, this sub-
national regulation is not effective in enforcing the regulation that private recruitment 
agencies should report their activities to the sub-national government since there is no legal 
basis upon which to enforce the law (Adi, 2014). Through their association, private 
recruitment agencies ask the central government to overrule the Perda, since it violates Law 
No. 34/2004 and should be abolished (Hardum, 2014). Besides, private recruitment agencies 
use informal recruiters, known as brokers or middlemen, as a way of getting potential migrant 
workers and sending them directly to Jakarta where many private recruitment agencies 
operate. The result is that many sub-national governments do not know how many migrant 
workers are sent from their administrative districts, since they have no control over the 
activities of the brokers who conduct recruitment activities in their administrative area 
(interview, local Member of Parliament, East Java, 2014).
Another instance where the initiatives implemented by sub-national government to 
create better governance in the recruitment process are constrained by the lack of authority 
given to supervise the recruitment process happened in West Nusa Tenggara. Due to the 
political willingness of the West Nusa Tenggara government, the province has a better 
registration system that means that it can easily identify suspicious applications from private 
recruitment agencies, such as “blank nominations” that have been sent by the official at the 
municipality level (DPR, 2015: 21). However, given their “unsettled supervision role”, they 
are not allowed to even raise an inquiry to the municipality office regarding the suspicious 
nomination. At the same time, the municipality government lacks the ability to conduct cross-
checks of the details of recruits due to the small budget from the central government. Hence, 
both provincial and municipality officials choose to play safe by allowing suspicious 
recruitment to pass to the central government (Dewanto, 2014).
Why is the central government reluctant to give a greater role to sub-national 
governments so that they have greater authority in overseeing the private recruitment 
agencies? One might argue that this is due to the mainstream discourse held by the central 
government, which stipulates that whilst the handling of domestic employment is the 
responsibility of sub-national governments, the handling of migrant workers is the 
responsibility of central government, since it is considered a foreign affairs issue (interview, 
Member of Parliament, Jakarta, 2014). Thus, giving licences to and evaluating the 
performance of private recruitment agencies should be under the authority of central 
government. However, the reason for the reluctance of central government to hand over the 
authority is far more complex. It is widely believed among migrant worker activists, as well 
as sub-national government officials, that the authority to give a licence both in the Ministry 
of Manpower and BNP2TKI has become an instrument to gain a kick-back fee from private 
recruitment agencies (interview, migrant worker activist, Jakarta, 2014).
Besides the lack of authority and the lack of a legal framework to operationalise their 
authority, the inability of sub-national governments to carry out effective supervision in the 
process of recruitment of Indonesian workers is also caused by confusion in implementing 
the policy made by central government given the institutional rivalry between the Ministry of 
Manpower and BNP2TKI. Since its inception in 2007, there have been many contradictory 
policies issued by the Ministry of Manpower and BNP2TKI, which have left the sub-national 
governments in regulatory limbo. The suspension of all private recruitment agency activities 
in the early 2014 could be a case in point with regard to how the rivalry between the two 
institutions creates confusion for the sub-national governments. In February 2014, following 
a letter of protest filed by the Private Recruiter Business Consortium (HIMSATAKI) 
demanding the suspension of the entire process of the placement of Indonesian workers, 
BNP2TKI sent a letter to the Ministry of Manpower, as well as sub-national governments, 
that resulted in the temporary termination of the placement of Indonesian migrant workers 
abroad by all private recruitment agencies. As of February 2014, 240 of 519 private 
recruitment agencies were suspended by the Ministry of Manpower. According to the private 
recruitment agencies suspended, their suspension by the Ministry of Manpower was allegedly 
due to their recruitment licences, as well as their employment agreements, being issued and 
validated by BNP2TKI. 
This temporary suspension of all recruitment and placement activities can be seen as 
retaliation by BNP2TKI towards the Ministry of Manpower, which tried to undermine 
BNP2TKI’s authority to issue recruitment licences. The policy issued by BNP2TKI caused 
the entire administration of the recruitment process to be suspended, thus making services to 
prospective Indonesian migrant workers constrained. The conflicting policy stemming from 
the institutional rivalry between BNP2TKI and the Ministry of Manpower has seriously 
affected the sub-national governments. As a result, it is the sub-national governments that 
need to deal with the protests from the prospective migrant workers who feel most aggrieved 
by this policy. 
Conclusion
The case of Indonesian migrant worker governance demonstrates some insights that need to 
be taken seriously. Firstly, it shows the importance of the analysis of the exploitation of the 
regulatory realm not only by private recruitment agencies, but also by regulatory institutions 
to secure their institutional interest. Hence, we should not be trapped in the debate regarding 
whether Indonesia’s migrant worker governance should be more interventionist, rather than 
liberal. The study contends that Indonesia’s migrant worker governance is both liberal, with 
the important role of private recruitment agencies and interventionist whereby the state 
deliberately attempts to restrict the demand of migrant workers through control over the 
private actors operating within the domestic market with its restrictive regulatory framework. 
However, as this paper has discussed, the more restrictive regulatory framework does not 
guarantee the emergence of better governance for the protection of migrant workers.  
This leads to the second important insight, which is how the complexity of regulatory 
actors’ interactions facilitates the persistence of bad management in the migrant worker 
recruitment process. The paper reveals that in the case of newly-democratised and 
decentralised Indonesia, the restrictive regulatory framework for the recruitment of migrant 
workers, which curbs private recruitment agencies, does not create better migrant worker 
governance, since the newly-established regulatory framework does not take into 
consideration the horizontal relationship between the old and new institutions and the vertical 
relationship between the central and sub-national governments. Horizontally, the bad 
institutional design of the new regulatory framework proposed to replace the old one has 
created institutional rivalry between the newly-established regulatory actor and the old one. 
Vertically, the reluctance of central government to decentralise authorities to sub-national 
government has amputated the ability of sub-national governments to perform a supervisory 
role in the recruitment process.
As shown in the analysis, the creation of BNP2TKI was aimed at creating more 
coherent coordination among the government institutions dealing with migrant workers. On 
the contrary, the current institutional arrangement for migrant worker recruitment has made 
the recruitment process a battleground enabling rent-seeking behaviour by individuals in the 
central government. At the national level, the establishment of BNP2TKI has created a 
dualism in the management of migrant workers between the Ministry of Manpower and 
BNP2TKI itself. As a consequence, the loopholes in the governance of migrant workers have 
increased due to the competition between the Ministry of Manpower and the newly-
established BNP2TKI in managing the recruitment of migrant workers. The institutional 
rivalry among the regulatory actors has widened the regulatory loopholes that can be 
exploited by private recruitment agencies. At the same time, the institutional rivalry between 
the two has affected the management of migrant workers by sub-national governments. This 
rivalry creates confusion among the sub-national governments in implementing the policies 
made by the central government regarding the migrant worker recruitment process. As a 
result, it is not surprising that, in Indonesia’s case, sub-national governments cannot interfere 
in many of the problems related to the recruitment process at the sub-national level. 
Considering that Indonesia has been one of the most significant exporters of migrant workers 
for the last two decades, the analysis regarding the institutional dynamics of the regulatory 
actors in the management of the migrant worker recruitment process can better inform 
migrant worker policy makers to focus not only on how to regulate private recruiters, but also 
how to create a better institutional design to minimise the chance of state agencies competing 
for authority.
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